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Consciousness: A Natural History*
“[W]e	always	start	at	the	sensory	end	and	try	to	come	out	
at	the	motor	side.	I	very	much	agree	with	the	late	von	Holst	
when	he	suggests	 that	we	start	at	 the	other	end	and	work	
our	why	(sic)	back	 toward	sensation.	…	It	 requires	some	
different	way	of	looking.”1
H.	L.	Teuber
“If	any	person	thinks	the	examination	of	the	rest	of	the	ani-
mal	kingdom	an	unworthy	task,	he	must	hold	in	like	dises-
teem	the	study	of	man.”2
Aristotle
Abstract
This article shows how the proper question to answer concerning consciousness is not ‘how 
consciousness arises in matter’, but how consciousness is part and parcel of the evolution 
of animate forms. The article traces out just such an evolution by consideration of real 
life forms including bacteria and invertebrates. It vindicates the evolutionary thesis that 
external proprioceptive organs, as evidenced in their own right, were modified and interna-
lized over time into kinesthetic organs, sustaining, in effect, a directly movement-sensitive 
corporeal consciousness across virtually all forms of evolutionary life. The paper specifies 
significant consequences of the thesis having to do with the unconscious, with present-day 
focal studies of the brain that neglect a correlative natural history, and with the need to at-
tend to corporeal matters of fact.
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Thomas	Nagel,	 in	 a	 review	of	 John	Searle’s	book,	The Rediscovery of the 
Mind,	states	that
“…	we	do	not	really	understand	the	claim	that	mental	states	are	states	of	the	brain.	…	We	are	
still	unable	to	form	a	conception	of	how	consciousness	arises	in	matter.”3
*
This	 article	 is	 based	 on	 but	 also	 extends	 an	
earlier	 article	 by	 the	 same	 title	 published	 in	
The Journal of Consciousness Studies	 5/3,	
1998:	260–294.
1
H.	L.	Teuber	in	“Discussion”	of		D.	M.	MacKay’s	
“Cerebral	 Organization	 and	 the	 Conscious	
Control	of	Action”,	in:	John	C.	Eccles	(ed.),	
Brain and Conscious Experience,	 Springer-
Verlag,	New	York	1966,	pp.	442–445;	quote	
from	 pp.	 440–441.	The	 theme	 of	 MacKay’s	
paper	is	“the	controlling	function	of	the	brain	
in	voluntary	agency”.	
2
Aristotle,	Parts of Animals	645a	26–27.
3
Thomas	Nagel,	“The	Mind	Wins!”,	New York 
Review of Books	(March	4,	1993):	37–41,	p.	40.
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The	missing	conception	is,	of	course,	really	a	missing	answer	to	the	question:	
How	does	consciousness	arise	in	matter?	Nagel’s	agreement	with	Searle	that	
“the	subjective”	is	precisely	the	missing	element	is	exemplified	in	his	recog-
nizably-worded	statement	that
“Facts	about	your	external	behavior	or	the	electrical	activity	or	functional	organization	of	your	
brain	may	be	closely	connected	with	your	conscious	experiences,	but	they	are	not	facts	about	
what it’s like	for	you	to	hear	a	police	siren.”4
The	question	of	“how	consciousness	arises	in	matter”	is	thus	clearly	central	to	
both	Nagel	and	Searle.
What	I	want	to	do	–	in	five	parts	–	is	outline	basic	reasons	for	thinking	the	
question	 spurious,	 thereby	 demonstrating	 how	 genuine	 understandings	 of	
consciousness	demand	close	and	serious	 study	of	evolution	as	a	history	of	
animate	form.	The	demonstration	has	sizable	implications:	(1)	a	re-thinking	
of	the	common	assumption	that	unconsciousness	historically	preceded	con-
sciousness;	(2)	a	recognition	of	the	need	to	delve	as	deeply	and	seriously	into	
natural	history	as	into	brains;	(3)	a	critical	stance	toward	arm-chair	judgments	
about	consciousness	and	a	correlative	turn	toward	corporeal	matters	of	fact.
I
Philosophers	of	mind	commonly	pursue	the	same	how	question	as	Searle	and	
Nagel,	but	many	if	not	most	take	quite	other	paths.	Daniel	Dennett	and	Paul	
Churchland	 are	 notable	 in	 this	 respect.	 Both	 endeavor	 to	 offer	 a	 historical	
perspective	by	placing	consciousness	first	of	all	in	cosmic	time.	Their	respec-
tive	attempts	are	not	protracted	by	any	means	and	neither	speaks	explicitly	of	
the organic	and	the inorganic.	In	what	is	nonetheless	a	clearly	cosmological	
answer	to	the	how	question,	both	advert	straightoff	to	the	advent	of	replicators	
and	the	process	of	self-replication,	thus	attempting	to	distill	inchoate	life	from	
the	“purely	chemical”.5
Dennett’s	and	Churchland’s	modest	nod	in	the	direction	of	a	natural	history	is	
short-lived.	Their	respective	“findings”	from	biological	studies	of	the	begin-
nings	of	 life	are	neither	carried	forward	in	a	consideration	of	 the	evolution	
of	animate	forms	nor	examined	in	the	light	of	the	diversity	of	actually	living	
creatures.	Their	 respective	allusions	 to	self-replication	suffice	for	a	histori-
cal	answer	to	the	question	of	“how	consciousness	arises	in	matter”	because	
self-replication	is	where	it	all	began	and	where	it	all	began	is	where	it	still	is:	
consciousness	is	a	matter	of	matter.	Their	jump	from	the	biology	of	self-repli-
cation	to	consciousness	constitutes	only	an	ostensibly	reasonable	move,	how-
ever,	because	a	major	problem	with	a	physicalist	explanation	of	conscious-
ness	is	clearly	evident.	It	is	succinctly	if	inadvertently	exemplified	in	Matter 
and Consciousness.	Whatever	Churchland	says	of	the	self-replicating	begin-
nings	of	life	at	the	end	of	his	book	is	predictably	cued	in	advance	by	what	he	
has	stated	at	the	beginning	of	his	book	about	human	life:
“[T]he	important	point	about	the	standard	evolutionary	story	is	that	the	human	species	and	all	of	
its	features	are	the	wholly	physical	outcome	of	a	purely	physical	process…	.	We	are	notable	only	
in	that	our	nervous	system	is	more	complex	and	powerful	than	those	of	our	fellow	creatures…	.	
We	are	creatures	of	matter.	And	we	should	learn	to	live	with	that	fact.”6
The	 problem	 comes	 not	 in	 living	 with	 that	 fact	 but	 in	 living	 hermetically	
with	that	fact.	Living	hermetically	with	that	fact	comes	at	the	expense	of	a	
viable	natural	history	for	the	fact	passes	over	fundamental	understandings	of	
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animate	life.	These	omissions	in	understanding	emerge	in	a	striking	way	in	
the	metaphysical	relationship	Churchland	proposes	between	the	organic	and	
inorganic.	He	 insists	 that	“living	systems”	differ	 from	“nonliving	systems”	
“only	by	degrees”:	“There	is	no	metaphysical	gap	to	be	bridged”	–	or,	as	he	
later	says,	applying	“the	same	lesson”	–	a	difference	“only	by	degrees”	–	to	
intelligence:	 “No	 metaphysical	 discontinuities	 emerge	 here”.7	 Churchland	
does	not	show	his	“lesson	 in	continuities”	 to	be	 true,	not	even	 through	his	
“lesson”	in	how	to	forge	definitions	of	life	that	will	be	opaque	to	discontinui-
ties,	such	as	claiming	that	“the	glowing	teardrop	of	a	candle	flame…	may	just	
barely	meet	 the	conditions	of	 the	definition	 [of	 life]	proposed”,	 i.e.,	 life	 is	
“any	semiclosed	physical	system	that	exploits	the	order	it	already	possesses,	
and	the	energy	flux	through	it,	in	such	a	way	as	to	maintain	and/or	increase	
its	internal	order”.8	In	brief,	Churchland’s	metaphysics	is	of necessity	true	in	
virtue	of	Churchland	theory:	if	human	consciousness	is	mere	matter	–	rela-
tively	“more	complex	and	powerful”	matter,9	but	mere	matter	nevertheless	
through	and	through	–	then	the	organic	can	differ	from	the	inorganic	“only	by	
degrees”.	Metaphysical	distinctions	are	blurred	by	fiat	as	only	they	can	be	in	
such	a	theory.10
The	consequences	of	holding	a	“no-gap-here”	metaphysical	theory	aside,	the	
major	question	is	whether	such	a	theory	actually	clarifies	consciousness.	In	
particular,	however	much	information	Churchland	gives	us	about	self-replica-
tion,	“energy	flux”,11	neurophysiology,	or	any	other	material	aspects	of	living	
systems,	 and	whatever	 the	progressively	 refined	definitions	 he	gives	 us	 of	
4
Th.	Nagel,	“The	Mind	Wins!”,	p.	39.
5
Paul	Churchland,	Matter and Consciousness,	
Bradford	 Books,	 Cambridge	 (MA)	 1984.	
Churchland’s	opening	sentence	of	the	first	sec-
tion	(“Neuroanatomy:	The	Evolutionary	Back-
ground”)	 of	 a	 chapter	 titled	 “Neuroscience”	
reads:	“Near	the	surface	of	the	earth’s	oceans,	
between	three	and	four	billion	years	ago,	the	
sun-driven	process	of	purely	chemical	evolu-
tion	produced	some	self-replicating	molecular	
structures”	(p.	121;	italics	in	original).	Daniel	
Dennett,	 Consciousness Explained,	 Little,	
Brown	 and	 Company,	 Boston	 1991.	 Den-
nett’s	opening	sentences	of	the	second	section	
(“Early	Days”)	of	a	chapter	titled	“The	Evolu-
tion	of	Consciousness”	reads:	“In	the	begin-
ning,	there	were	no	reasons;	there	were	only	
causes…	The	explanation	 for	 this	 is	 simple.	
There	was	nothing	that	had	interests.	But	after	
millennia	 there	 happened	 to	 emerge	 simple	
replicators”	(p.	173;	italics	in	original).
6
P.	Churchland,	Matter and Consciousness,	p.	
21.
7
Ibid.,	p.	153.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.,	p.	21.
10
At	 least	 one	 consequence	 of	 the	 blurring	
should	be	singled	out	in	order	to	demonstrate	
the	 questionable	 propriety	 of	 claiming	 that	
“No	 metaphysical	 discontinuities	 emerge	
here”.	 A	 continuous	 metaphysics	 creates	
a	 problem	 for	 distinguishing	 in	 traditional	
Western	ways	between	life	and	death.	How-
ever	 rationally	 doubtful,	 quasi-eternal	 life	
(‘quasi’	 insofar	 as	 eternal	 life	 is	 punctuated	
from	 time	 to	 time	but	not	wholly	discontin-
ued)	 suddenly	 emerges	 on	 the	 smudgy	 face	
of	things	as	a	viable	metaphysical	future	pos-
sibility-if	 only	 materialist	 philosophers	 can	
deliver	 up	 their	 stone,	 aided,	 of	 course,	 by	
deliveries	on	promises	by	Western	materialist	
science.	Of	course,	 the	notion	of	cosmically	
differing	“only	by	degrees”	is	in	a	metaphysi-
cally	twisted	and	thoroughly	ironic	way	also	
supportive	of	Eastern	notions	such	as	reincar-
nation	and	of	so-called	“primitive”	notions	of	
life	after	death,	notions	exemplified	by	non-
Western	 burial	 practices	 in	 which	 dead	 per-
sons	 are	 interred	 along	with	 items	 they	will	
need	in	their	ongoing	journeys.	With	respect	
to	 these	 notions,	 however,	 it	 is	 rather	 some	
form	of	the	mental	that	is	primary;	matter	is	
simply	contingent	stuff	for	the	instantiation	of	
spirit.	What	differs	“only	by	degrees”	is	thus	
not	 fundamentally	matter	at	all	but	a	princi-
ple	of	life-spiritus,	pneuma,	or	whatever	else	
might	 be	 conceived	 to	 constitute	 invincible	
and	inexhaustible	animating	vapors.
11
Ibid.,	p.	152–154.
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life,	we	never	seem	to	arrive	at	an	elucidation	of	consciousness.	The	reduc-
tive	equation	of	consciousness	to	matter	is	not	in fact	shown.	The	reductionist	
program	is	at	best	a	matter	of	correlation:	when	there	is	consciousness,	there	
is	a	certain	kind	of	electrical	activity	ongoing	in	a	brain;	when	there	is	not	
consciousness,	there	is	not	that	certain	kind	of	electrical	activity	ongoing	in	
the	brain,	but	electrical	activity	of	another	kind,	or	no	electrical	activity	at	all.	
As	physiologist	Benjamin	Libet	has	observed:
“One	can	only	describe	relationships	between	subjective	phenomena	and	neural	events,	not	how	
one	gets	from	one	to	the	other.”12
We	are	in	fact	a	long	way	from	a	natural	history	of	consciousness.	We	are	
an	equally	long	way	in	Dennett’s	account,	particularly	with	his	tethering	of	
consciousness	to	a	Center	of	Narrative	Gravity.	By	radically	privileging	lan-
guage,	Dennett	pulls	the	evolutionary	rug	out	from	under	us.	A	consideration	
of	language	as	he	conceives	it	shows	the	slippage	unequivocally.	If	human	
language	 explains	 consciousness,	 then	 consciousness	 arose	 in	 the	 form	 of	
human	language.	The	question	Dennett	does	not	ask	himself,	but	should	ask	
himself,	is	how	human	language	itself	arose.	Indeed,	he	should	ask	not	only	
how	human	language	could	even	have	been	conceived	short	of	an	already	
existing	consciousness	but	how	human	language	could	even	have	been	stan-
dardized	 short	of	 already	 intact	 consciousnesses.13	Dennett	does	not	 seem	
remotely	aware	of	such	questions,	much	less	aware	of	their	needing	answers	
–	which	is	why	only	linguistic	creationism	can	explain	a	Dennettian	consci-
ousness.14
II
It	is	instructive	at	this	point	to	look	briefly	at	definitions	of	life	both	to	bring	to	
the	fore	the	import	of	the	animate	and	to	highlight	the	troublesome	textual	use	
of	quotation	marks	as	a	means	of	apportioning	mental	credit	(e.g.,	the	raven	
“knows”,	 the	baboon	“recognizes”).	Biological	 texts	devote	 some	pages	 to	
definitions	of	life.	Among	the	constituents	of	those	definitions	is	self-replica-
tion.	Order	and	energy	are	also	named.	Responsivity	is	specified	as	a	further	
prime	constituent.	As	one	text	notes:
“Plant	seedlings	bend	 toward	 the	 light;	mealworms	congregate	 in	dampness;	cats	pounce	on	
small	moving	objects;	even	certain	bacteria	move	toward	or	away	from	particular	chemicals…	
[T]he	capacity	to	respond	is	a	fundamental	and	almost	universal	characteristic	of	life.”15
Oddly	 enough,	 this	 “fundamental	 and	 almost	 universal”	 dimension	 of	 life	
does	 not	 typically	 figure	 in	 definitions	 of	 life	 offered	 by	 philosophers	 of	
mind,	 especially	 those	 wedded	 to	 computational	 models.	 Yet	 responsivity	
–	bending,	congregating,	pouncing,	moving	toward	or	away,	in	short,	anima-
tion	–	commonly	appears	an	integral	part	of	cognition,	hence	part	and	parcel	
of	consciousness.	If	queried	on	the	matter,	such	philosophers	might	respond	
that	it	depends	on	what	is	doing	the	pouncing	whether	the	terms	‘cognitive’	
or	 ‘conscious’	apply.	What	basically	matters,	however,	 is	not	who	 is	doing	
the	pouncing	but	 the	ability	 to	provide	a	wholly	unprejudiced	rationale	for	
the	common	textual	practice	of	making	cognitive	distinctions	diacritically	in	
order	 to	separate	real	knowing	from	“knowing”,	 real	 recognition	from	“re-
cognition”.	Indeed,	there	is	a	mandate	to	specify	the	exact	degree(s)	at	which	
quotation	marks	are	appropriate.	But	there	is	also	a	problem:	any	specification	
is	as	arbitrary	as	it	is	mandatory.	Whatever	might	be	claimed	to	constitute	a	
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criterion	is	not	a	matter	of	fact	but	a	matter	of	human	judgment.	While	cra-
nial	capacities,	neuron	counts,	and	dendritic	branchings	certainly	constitute	
matters	of	fact,	 these	matters	of	fact	do	not	 in themselves	 specify	anything	
whatsoever	in	the	way	of	a	standard.	One	might	well	recall	what	Darwin	con-
cluded	in	his	study	of	Hymenoptera	(insects	such	as	ants	and	bees):
“It	is	certain	that	there	may	be	extraordinary	mental	activity	with	an	extremely	small	absolute	
mass	of	nervous	matter.”16
In	short,	specification	–	whatever	 its	putative	standard	–	 turns	out	 to	be	as	
completely	arbitrary	as	it	is	mandatory.	Indeed,	in	its	arbitrariness,	specifica-
tion	can	only	be	labelled	“subjective”;	a	standard	completely	impervious	to	
human	bias	cannot	possibly	be	identified.	In	consequence,	a	cancelling	of	all	
quotation	marks	appears	warranted.	The	following	description	of	a	bacterium	
moving	“toward	or	away	from	particular	chemicals”	is	an	especially	interest-
ing	as	well	as	exemplary	candidate	in	this	respect:
“Processing	in	a	bacterium	may	be	thought	of	as	a	sort	of	molecular	polling:	…	the	positive	
‘votes’	cast	by	receptors	in	response,	say,	to	increasing	concentrations	of	a	sugar	are	matched	
against	 the	negative	votes	produced	by	increasing	concentrations	of	noxious	compounds.	On	
the	basis	of	this	continuous	voting	process,	the	bacterium	‘knows’	whether	the	environment,	on	
the	whole,	is	getting	better	or	worse.	The	results	of	this	analysis	appear	to	be	communicated	by	
electrical	signals	to	the	response	centers.	The	final	stage,	the	response,	consists	of	a	brief	change	
in	the	direction	of	rotation	of	the	several	stiff,	helical	flagella	that	propel	 the	bacterium.	The	
12
Benjamin	Libet,	“Subjective	Antedating	of	a	
Sensory	 Experience	 and	 Mind-Brain	 Theo-
ries:	Reply	to	Honderich	(1984)	”,	Journal of 
Theoretical Biology	114	(1985):	563–570,	p.	
568.
13
For	a	discussion	of	these	matters	in	detail,	see	
author’s	book	The Roots of Thinking,	Temple	
University	Press,	Philadelphia	1990.
14
We	should	note	that	if	the	distinction	between	
the	organic	and	the	inorganic	is	blurred,	then	
of	course	distinctions	among	the	organic	are	
also	 blurred-just	 as	 Churchland	 in	 fact	 says	
they	are	blurred	with	respect	to	intelligence:	
there	are	differences	“only	by	degrees”.	But	
the	blurring	between	organic	forms	is	neces-
sarily	finer	than	the	blurring	between	the	or-
ganic	 and	 the	 inorganic	 since	organic	 forms	
are	 comparatively	 more	 closely	 related	 to	
each	other	 than	 they	are	 to	 the	 inorganic.	 In	
effect,	 to	 be	 consistent	 with	 Churchland’s	
theory,	 common	 textual	 practice	 should	 be	
altered.	Quotation	marks	 typically	surround-
ing	 cognitive	 functions	 as	 they	 are	 ascribed	
to	what	are	termed	“lower”	forms	should	be	
erased.	A	difference	“only	by	degrees”	does	
not	justify	them.	In	a	quite	provocative	sense,	
one	might	say	that	Churchland’s	overarching	
metaphysical	 blurring	 on	 behalf	 of	 an	 unre-
lenting	 materialism-whether	 one	 finds	 the	
latter	 credible	 or	 not-forces	 an	 examination	
and	justification	of	common	textual	practice.	
It	clearly	calls	our	attention	to	a	fundamental	
question	 about	 where	 and	 on	 what	 grounds	
cognitive	 lines	are	diacritically	drawn	 in	or-
der	to	distinguish	among	capacities	of	various	
forms	of	organic	 life.	All	 the	same,	 it	 is	 im-
portant	to	emphasize	that	we	are	not	charged	
with	the	task	of	making	distinctions	in	mate-
rial	 complexity,	 thus	with	 the	 task	of	 taking	
neuron	counts	and	the	 like.	On	the	contrary,	
we	are	charged	with	the	task	of	understanding 
the animate.	 Accordingly,	 the	 quest	 begins	
from	the	other	side.	We	take	the	phenomena	
themselves	as	a	point	of	departure,	not	theory,	
and	earnestly	inquire	into	what	we	observe	to	
be	 living	realities.	Denying	distinctions	 thus	
becomes	 in	 this	 instance	 and	 in	 a	 heuristic	
sense	 epistemologically	 salutary	 rather	 than	
metaphysically	corybantic.
15
Helena	Curtis,	Biology,	Worth	Publishers,	NY	
1976,	p.	28.	(Curtis’s	book	is	a	standard	text	
in	biology.)
16
Charles	 Darwin,	 The Descent of Man and 
Selection in Relation to Sex,	 Princeton	 Uni-
versity	Press,	Princeton	1981	[1871],	p.	145.	
Darwin	goes	on	to	say:	“[T]hus	the	wonder-
fully	diversified	instincts,	mental	powers,	and	
affections	 of	 ants	 are	 generally	 known,	 yet	
their	cerebral	ganglia	are	not	so	 large	as	 the	
quarter	of	a	small	pin’s	head.	Under	this	latter	
point	of	view,	the	brain	of	an	ant	is	one	of	the	
most	marvellous	atoms	of	matter	in	the	world,	
perhaps	 more	 marvellous	 than	 the	 brain	 of	
man”	 (Ibid.).	 (Hymenoptera	 are	 an	 order	 of	
insects	including	bees,	ants,	and	wasps.)
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result	is	that	the	bacterium	founders	briefly	and	then	strikes	out	in	a	new	direction,	once	again	
sampling	to	see	whether	the	environment	is	improving	or	deteriorating.”17
In	addition	 to	being	an	exemplary	candidate	 for	diacritical	erasure,	 the	de-
scriptive	passage	demonstrates	in	an	intimately	related	way	why	responsivity	
–	the	“fundamental	and	almost	universal	characteristic	of	life”	–	is	of	critical	
import.	Sampling,	foundering,	and	striking	out	in	a	new	direction	are	precise-
ly	a	matter	of	animation	and	animation	is	precisely	in	some	sense	cognitive	or	
mindful	–	as	in	assessing	propitious	and	noxious	aspects	of	the	environment.	
Cognitive	aspects	of	organic	animation	–	in	this	instance,	cognitive	aspects	of	
a	bacterium’s	animation	–	cannot	thus	reasonably	be	considered	mere	figura-
tive	 aspects.	More	generally,	 cognitive	 capacities	 cannot	 reasonably	be	 re-
served	only	for	what	are	commonly	termed	“higher-order”	organisms.
The	unjustifiable	use	of	diacritical	markings	to	distinguish	cognitively	among	
organisms	leads	to	a	series	of	interlinked	demands:	a	cessation	of	reliance	on	
what	is	in	fact	a	conceptually	lazy,	inapt,	and/or	obfuscating	textual	practice;	
a	corollary	recognition	of	the	import	of	animation;	a	consequent	investigation	
of	the	animate	in	terms	of	its	natural	history;	a	delineation	of	what	it	means	
cognitively	 to	be	 animate.	 In	 a	 quite	 provocative	 sense,	 one	might	 say	 that	
Churchland’s	 blurring	 of	 metaphysical	 lines	 leads	 to	 such	 a	 series	 of	 inter-
linked	demands.	His	overarching	metaphysical	blurring	on	behalf	of	an	unre-
lenting	materialism	–	whether	one	finds	the	latter	credible	or	not	–	forces	an	
examination	and	justification	of	common	textual	practice	and	typical	Western	
thinking	regarding	so-called	“higher”	and	“lower”	forms	of	life.	It	clearly	calls	
our	attention	to	a	fundamental	question	about	where	and	on	what	grounds	cog-
nitive	lines	are	diacritically	drawn	in	order	to	distinguish	among	capacities	of	
various	forms	of	organic	life.	All	the	same,	it	is	important	to	emphasize	that	in	
answering	to	the	fourfold	demand,	we	are	not	charged	with	the	task	of	making	
distinctions	in	material	complexity	by	taking	neuron	counts	and	the	like.	On	
the	contrary,	we	are	charged	with	the	task	of	understanding the animate,	pre-
cisely	as	the	bacterium	example	demonstrates.	Accordingly,	the	quest	begins	
from	the	other	side.	We	take	the	phenomena	themselves	as	a	point	of	departure,	
not	theory,	and	earnestly	inquire	into	what	we	observe	to	be	living	realities.
III
“Know	thyself”	is	a	Socratic	imperative.	It	may	also	be	said	to	be	a	built-in	
biological	one.	This	imperative	is	most	effectively	elucidated	by	way	of	de-
scriptive	remarks	Dennett	makes	about	“The	Reality	of	Selves”	in	the	process	
of	explaining	consciousness.
Energetically	 affirming	 that	 “every	 agent	 has	 to	 know	 which	 thing	 in	 the	
world	it	 is!”,18	Dennett	begins	by	specifying	what	this	knowing	entails.	He	
considers	first	“simpler	organisms”	for	whom
“…	there	is	really	nothing	much	to	self-knowledge	beyond	the	rudimentary	biological	wisdom	
enshrined	in	such	maxims	as	When	Hungry,	Don’t	Eat	Yourself!	and	When	There’s	a	Pain,	It’s	
Yours!”19
In	this	context,	he	says	of	a	lobster	that	“it	might	well	eat	another	lobster’s	
claws,	but	the	prospect	of	eating	one	of	its	own	claws	is	conveniently	unthink-
able	to	it”.	He	goes	on	to	say	that
“Its	options	are	limited,	and	when	it	‘thinks	of’	moving	a	claw,	its	‘thinker’	is	directly	and	appro-
priately	wired	to	the	very	claw	it	thinks	of	moving.”20
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The	 situation	 is	 different,	 Dennett	 says,	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 controlling	 “the	
sorts	of	sophisticated	activities	human	bodies	engage	in”,	because	“there	are	
more	options,	and	hence	more	sources	of	confusion”.21	He	states	that
“…	the	body’s	control	system	(housed	in	the	brain)	has	to	be	able	to	recognize	a	wide	variety	of	
different	sorts	of	inputs	as	informing	it	about	itself,	and	when	quandaries	arise	or	skepticism	sets	
in,	the	only	reliable	(but	not	foolproof)	way	of	sorting	out	and	properly	assigning	this	informa-
tion	is	to	run	little	experiments:	do	something	and	look	to	see	what	moves”.22
The	experimental	approach	 is	 the	 same,	Dennett	 says,	whether	a	matter	of	
“external	signs	of	our	own	bodily	movement”	or	“internal	states,	tendencies,	
decisions,	strengths	and	weaknesses”:	“Do	something	and	‘look’	to	see	what	
‘moves’.”23	With	respect	to	internal	knowledge,	he	adds	that	“An	advanced	
agent	must	build	up	practices	for	keeping	track	of	both	its	bodily	an	‘mental’	
circumstances.”
Dennett’s	descriptive	passages	of	course	readily	offer	 themselves	as	candi-
dates	for	erasure	no	less	than	passages	in	biology.	He	marks	mental	pheno-
mena	 diacritically	 both	 in	 order	 to	 make	 distinctions	 between	 higher	 and	
lower	forms	of	life	and	in	order	to	maintain	a	thoroughly	materialized	con-
sciousness.	What	his	diacritical	markings	actually	allow	is	his	having	his	ma-
terial	cake	and	eating	it	too.	However	loose	his	vocabulary	–	e.g.,	a	thinking	
lobster	–	and	however	much	it	strays	from	purely	materialist	theory	–	mental	
as	well	as	bodily	circumstances	–	it	is	diacritically	reined	in	to	accord	with	
the	theoretical	distinctions	he	wants	to	maintain	and	the	materialist	doctrine	
he	wants	to	uphold.
What	makes	both	the	entailments	and	elaboration	of	Dennett’s	energetic	af-
firmation	such	a	compelling	and	richly	informative	point	of	departure	for	ex-
amining	the	bio-Socratic	imperative	is	precisely	what	they	overlook	in	theory,	
method,	and	fact.	It	is	as	if	proprioception	in	general	and	kinesthesia	in	par-
ticular24	did	not	exist;	whatever	the	talk	of	movement,	it	is	as	if	the	sense of 
movement	were	nonexistent.	Thus,	one	has	to	look	and	see	what	is	moving.	
In	such	an	account,	the	kinesthetic	is	more	than	overridden	by	the	visual;	it	
is	not	even	on	the	books.	Were	one	to	examine	Dennett’s	 theory	of	human	
agency	with	respect	 to	infants,	one	would	straightaway	discover	its	error.25	
We	humans	learn	“which	thing	we	are”	by	moving	and	attending	to	our	own	
movement.	Indeed,	along	with	many	other	primates,	we	must	learn to	move	
ourselves.	We	do	so	not	by	looking	and	seeing	what	we’re	moving;	we	do	so	
by	attending	to	our	bodily	feelings	of	movement,	which	include	a bodily felt 
17
William	T.	Keeton	and	James	L.	Gould,	Bio-
logical Science,	 W.	 W.	 Norton	 &	 Co.,	 New	
York	41986,	p.	452.
18
Daniel	Dennett,	Consciousness Explained,	p.	
427.
19
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.,	pp.	427–28.
23
Ibid.
24
Proprioception	refers	generally	to	a	sense	of	
movement	 and	 position.	 It	 thus	 includes	 an	
awareness	of	movement	and	position	through	
tactility	as	well	as	kinesthesia,	that	is,	through	
external	 as	 well	 as	 internal	 sense	 organs,	
including	 also	 a	 sense	 of	 gravitational	 ori-
entation	 through	 vestibular	 sensory	 organs.	
Kinesthesia	 refers	 specifically	 to	 a	 sense	 of	
movement	through	muscular	effort.	
25
Were	one	to	examine	it	with	respect	to	blind	
people,	one	would	do	the	same.
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sense	of	the	direction	of	our	movement,	its	speed,	its	range,	its	tension,	and	
so	on.	In	turn,	we	learn	to	distinguish	certain	kinesthetic	bodily	feelings	from	
certain	other	kinesthetic	bodily	feelings.	The	putative	agent	who	looks	to	see	
what	moves	could	hardly	be	an	effective	agent.	A	bona	fide	agent	is	not	only	
aware	of	initiating	movement	but	aware	of	its	spatio-temporal	and	energy	dy-
namics.26	An	agent	devoid	of	kinesthesia	in	fact	belongs	to	no	known	natural	
species.	Agents-those	having	the	power	to	initiate	movement	and	to	direct	it	
toward	certain	ends-necessarily	have	a	kinesthetic	sense	of	their	own	move-
ment.
Kinesthesia	is	nowhere	acknowledged	by	Dennett	as	a	feature	of	“simpler”	
creatures	any	more	than	it	is	of	“complex”	ones.	The	idea	that	creatures	have	
a	sense	of	their	own	body	and	body	movement	is	an	alien	thought	in	itself,	
not	just	a	thought	alien	to	the	theory	of	a	thoroughly	materialized	conscious-
ness.	Whoever	“the	thinker”	might	be	in	Dennett’s	zoology,	it	appears	to	get	
what	it	wants	simply	in	virtue	of	its	impeccable	motor	wiring.	Yet	we	should	
ask	what	it	means	to	say	that	a	lobster	will	eat	another’s	claw	but	that	con-
veniently,	as	Dennett	puts	it,	it	finds	eating	one	of	its	own	claws	unthinkable.	
Does	it	mean	that	there	is	actually	a	rule	“Don’t	eat	your	own	claw!”	wired	
into	the	lobster’s	neurological	circuitry?	But	it	is	patently	unparsimonious	to	
think	that	there	is	such	a	rule	and	patently	absurd	to	think	that	every	creature	
comes	prepared	with	an	owner’s	manual,	as	it	were,	a	rulebook	replete	with	
what	Dennett	 calls	 “maxims”.	Such	a	maxim,	 for	 example,	would	be	only	
the	beginning	of	an	 indefinitely	great	number	of	maxims	 that	a	 lobster	 (or	
any	other	so-called	“simpler	organism”)	could	be	said	to	carry	around	in	the	
neural	 machinery	 that	 counts	 as	 its	 “Headquarters”:27	 “Don’t	 try	 to	 go	 on	
land!”	“Don’t	try	to	eat	a	squid!”	“The	large	claw	is	for	crushing!	–	the	small	
claw	is	for	seizing	and	tearing!”	And	so	on.	What	makes	eating	its	own	claws	
“conveniently	unthinkable”	is	clearly	something	other	than	a	rule	of	conduct.	
Indeed,	the	putative	evolutionary	sense	of	convenience	that	Dennett	invokes	
is	misguided.	“Convenience”	is	not	a	matter	of	an	opportune	adaptation	but	of	
an	astoundingly	varied	and	intricately	detailed	biological	faculty	that	allows	a	
creature	to	know	its	own	body	and	its	own	body	in	movement.28
IV
Animate	forms	are	built	in	ways	that	are	sensitive	to	movement.	They	can	be	
sensitive	to	dynamic	modifications	in	the	surrounding	world	and	to	dynamic	
modifications	of	their	own	body.	A	moment’s	serious	reflection	on	the	matter	
discloses	a	major	reason	why	movement	sensitivity	is	both	basic	and	para-
mount:	no	matter	what	 the	particular	world	(Umwelt)29	 in	which	an	animal	
lives,	it	is	not	an	unchanging	world.	Hence,	whatever	the	animal,	its	move-
ment	cannot	be	absolutely	programmed	such	 that	at	all	 times	 its	particular	
speed	 and	direction	of	movement,	 its	 every	 impulse	 and	 stirring,	 its	 every	
pause	and	stillness,	run	automatically	on	something	akin	to	a	lifetime	tape.	
Consider,	 for	example,	an	earthworm,	 its	body	pressed	against	 the	earth	as	
it	crawls	along,	or	a	beetle	walking	along	the	ground.	In	each	case,	the	im-
mediate	environment	is	tangibly	inconsistent;	it	has	topological	and	textural	
irregularities-bumps	here,	 smoothness	 there,	moisture	here,	hardness	 there.	
Both	earthworm	and	beetle	must	adjust	kinetically	to	what	they	find	in	the	im-
mediate	moment.	A	prominent	invertebrate	researcher	makes	this	very	point:
“Information	regarding	the	absolute	disposition	of	the	body	is	imperative	in	order	that	minor	
adjustments	of	muscular	activity	may	be	made	to	cope	with	irregularities	in	the	surface.”30
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Clearly,	the	world	is	less	than	consistent	in	its	conformations,	and	any	animal	
that	survives	must	literally	or	figuratively	bend	to	its	demands.	Consider	fur-
ther	that	air	and	water	move,	and	that	movement	in	the	form	of	currents	or	
winds	agitates,	deforms,	or	otherwise	impinges	on	animal	bodies.	In	effect,	
such	movement	influences	how	an	animal	moves	from	moment	to	moment.	A	
locust’s	face,	for	example,	is	covered	with	hairs	that	respond	to	the	movement	
of	air	across	their	surface:
“Each	hair	 responds	maximally	 to	wind	from	a	specific	direction,	with	 the	optimal	direction	
being	determined	by	the	angle	of	curvature	of	the	hair	shaft.”31
Sensitivity	to	its	facial	hair	displacements	facilitates	the	locust’s	control	of	lift	
during	flight	and	is	informative	of	orientation	in	flying.	The	intricateness	of	a	
spider’s	external	proprioceptive	system	offers	equally	impressive	testimony	
to	the	importance	of	proprioception.	Hairs	on	its	body,	when	bent,	inform	it	of	
its	orientation	relative	to	its	web,	for	example.32	Far	more	numerous	than	its	
hairs,	however,	are	other	surface	sensory	organs	called	slit	sensilla.	A	spider’s	
slit	sensilla	are	functionally	analogous	to	an	insect’s	campaniform	sensilla;33	
both	are	sensitive	to	deformation.	To	give	an	idea	of	the	singular	importance	
of	 such	proprioceptors,	 consider	 that	 the	hunting	 spider	 (Cupiennius salei)	
26
Were	Dennett’s	 injunctions	 taken	 literally	at	
the	 letter,	 his	 agent-so-called-would	 have	 to	
have	 in	sight	at	all	 times	all	parts	of	his/her	
body	 in	 order	 to	 see	 what	 they	 were	 doing.	
Such	an	agent	could	in	no	way	build	up	prac-
tices	 in	 the	manner	Dennett	suggests	for	 the	
build	up	of	 such	practices	depends	upon	ki-
nesthesia	and	kinesthetic	memory.
27
D.	 Dennett,	 Consciousness Explained,	 e.g.,	
p.	106:	“The	brain	is	Headquarters,	the	place	
where	the	ultimate	observer	is…”
28
Dennett	 is	 not	 alone	 either	 in	 his	 omission	
of	the	kinesthetic	or	in	his	privileging	of	the	
visual.	Typically,	kinesthesia	never	makes	an	
appearance	 in	 discussions	 of	 “the	 senses”	 –	
the	five senses.	Any	cursory	glance	at	indices	
of	relevant	books	in	biology,	psychology,	and	
philosophy	discloses	either	a	radically	abbre-
viated	treatment	of	kinesthesia	in	comparison	
to	vision	(and	audition),	or	a	complete	lack	of	
treatment	altogether.	One	might	say	with	good	
reason	that	the	mind/body	problem	is	written	
into	the	very	texts	themselves.	Moreover	the	
topic	 of	 body	 movement,	 if	 making	 an	 ap-
pearance	at	all,	typically	comes	on	the	scene	
only	 marginally	 in	 these	 books.	 The	 way	 it	
does	so	is	through	reduction	to	the brain	and	
its	efferent	pathways.	In	both	typical	instanc-
es,	we	come	up	painfully	short	of	a	sense	of	
movement.	In	one	respect	it	is	not	surprising	
that	kinesthesia	is	omitted	or	slighted	and	that	
we	believe	ourselves	to	have	only	five	senses.	
As	adults,	we	have	long	since	forgotten	how	
we	 learned	 to	move	ourselves-in	a	very	real	
sense,	 how	 we	 learned	 our	 bodies.	 More-
over,	 kinesthesia	 is	 fundamental	 not	 only	 to	
our	knowledge	of	“which	thing	in	the	world	
we	 are”;	 it	 is	 fundamental	 both	 to	our	 abi-
lity	to	make	our	way	in	the	world	–	to	move	
knowledgeably	in	it	–	and	to	our	knowledge	
of	the	world	itself.	Though	we	may	have	for-
gotten	what	we	first	learned	of	the	world	itself	
through	movement	and	touch,	there	is	no	doubt	
but	that	we	came	to	know	it	first	by	moving	
and	 touching	our	way	 through	 it,	 in	a	word,	
through	our	tactile	–	kinesthetic	body.
29
Jakob	von	Uexküll,	Theoretische Biologie,	 J.	
Springer,	 Berlin	 21928.	 Cf.	 Ernst	 Cassirer’s	
concise	explanation	of	why	there	are	Umwelts:	
“Every	organism…	has	a	world	of	its	own	be-
cause	it	has	an	experience	of	its	own”.	Ernst	
Cassirer,	An Essay on Man, Bantam	Books,	
New	York	1970,	p.	25.
30
M.	 S.	 Laverack,	 “External	 Proprioceptors”,	
in:	P.	J.	Mill	(ed.),	Structure and Function of 
Proprioceptors in the Invertebrates,	Chapman	
and	Hall,	London	1976,	pp.	1–63,	pp.	4–5.
31
Ibid.,	pp.	5–6.
32
Ibid.,	p.	27.
33
See,	 for	 example,	 B.	 R.	 Wright,	 “Limb	 and	
Wing	Receptors	 in	 Insects,	Chelicerates	and	
Myriapods”,	in:	P.	J.	Mill	(ed.),	Structure and 
Function of Proprioceptors in the Inverte-
brates,	pp.	323–386;	pp.	353–354.
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has	over	3000	slit	organs	on	its	walking	legs.34	Given	the	quantity	of	such	or-
gans,	it	is	no	wonder	that,	as	one	invertebrate	researcher	writes,	“the	quantity	
of	proprioceptive	information…	from	an	appendage	at	a	particular	time	(e.g.,	
during	walking)	may	be	considerable”.35
The	astoundingly	varied	and	intricately	detailed	biological	faculty	that	allows	
knowing	one’s	own	body	and	body	movement	and	that	thereby	allows	know-
ing	the	world,	is	a	dimension	of	consciousness.	Inversely,	consciousness	is	a	
dimension	of	living	forms	that	move	themselves,	that	are	animate,	and	that,	in	
their	animation,	are	in	multiple	and	complex	ways	engaged	in	the	world.	The	
earlier	description	of	a	bacterium’s	cognitive	capacities	is	relevant	precisely	
in	this	context.	What	the	description	indicates	is	a	chemically-mediated	tactile	
discrimination	of	bodies	apart	from,	or	outside	of,	its	own	body.	Its	discrimi-
native	ability	might	justifiably	be	termed	a	“meta-corporeal”	consciousness,	
a	 consciousness	 of	 something	 beyond	 itself.	 Clearly,	 the	 essentialy	 tactile	
ability	to	disciminate	bodies	other	than	oneself	is	not	the	same	as	a	proprio-
ceptive	ability	to	discriminate	aspects	of	oneself	as	an	animate	form.	Prop-
rioceptively-endowed	creatures	are	not	only	always	in	touch	with	something	
outside	themselves;	they	tactilely	deform	and	compress	themselves	bodily	in	
the	process	of	moving.	When	a	creature	bends	its	leg,	for	example,	it	brings	
two	surfaces	in	contact	with	each	other	–	in	mutual	deformation.	Tactility	thus	
enters	 into	 the	 essentially	 kinetic	 cognitional	 abilities	 by	 which	 a	 creature	
discriminates	aspects	of	itself	as	an	animate	form.	In	the	most	fundamental	
sense,	these	kinetic	cognitional	abilities	constitute	a	corporeal consciousness,	
a	consciousness	that,	as	I	have	suggested	and	as	I	will	now	illustrate	in	further	
if	necessarily	brief	ways,	 is	an	astoundingly	varied	and	 intricately	detailed	
biological	faculty.	The	purpose	of	the	further	illustrations	is	again	to	link	un-
derstandings	of	consciousness	to	corporeal	matters	of	fact	and	thereby	to	an	
evolutionary	history.	 In	other	words,	with	a	 recognition	and	understanding	
of	the	rootedness	of	consciousness	in	corporeal	matters	of	fact,	we	can	be-
gin	to	grasp	the	possibility	of	a	true	evolutionary	history	of	consciousness.	It	
bears	emphasizing	that	we do this by direct consideration of the topic at is-
sue: consciousness,	and	not	by	appeal	to	constituents	in	definitions	of	life-to	
self-replication,	organization,	and	so	on.	The	notion	of	consciousness	as	fun-
damentally	a	corporeal	phenomenon	in	fact	already	suggests	a	radical	revi-
sion	of	the	common	evolutionary	characterization	of	consciousness	both	as	“a	
higher	order”	function,	i.e.,	a	function	having	nothing	to	do	with	bodies,	and	
as	a	“higher	order”	function	exclusive	to	“higher”	forms	of	life,	i.e.,	a	preemi-
nently	human	endowment.	Similarly,	it	already	suggests	a	radical	revision	of	
the	 materialist’s	 characterization	 of	 consciousness	 as	 identical	 with	 neuro-
logical	brain	events.	The	key	to	this	reconceptualization	of	consciousness	and	
to	its	evolutionary	import	is	the	realization	that	bodies	in	the	form	of	living	
creatures	are	not	mere	physical	things	but	animate	forms.	Consciousness	is	
thus	not	in matter;	it	is	a	dimension	of	living	forms,	in	particular,	a	dimension	
of	living	forms	that	move	themselves.
V
An	invertebrate	may	be	soft-	or	hard-bodied.	Hard-bodied	invertebrates	are	
so	called	because	they	have	articulable	body	parts	attached	to	an	exoskeleton.	
As	suggested	by	the	above	examples,	hard-bodied	invertebrates	have	external	
sensilla	 of	 various	 kinds:	 hairs,	 exoskeletal	 plates,	 epidermal	 organs,	 cilia,	
spines,	pegs,	slits,	and	so	on.	 It	 is	 these	external	sensory	organs	 that	make	
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possible	an	awareness	of	surface	events	in	the	double	sense	noted	above:	an	
awareness	of	the	terrain	on	which	and/or	the	environment	through	which	the	
animal	is	moving	and	an	awareness	of	bodily	deformations	or	stresses	occur-
ring	coincident	with	moving	on	the	terrain	and/or	through	the	environment.	
To	appreciate	in	a	beginning	way	the	difference	in	proprioceptive	sensitivity	
between	hard-	and	soft-bodied	invertebrates,	compare,	for	example,	a	beetle	
and	a	polyp.	A	beetle	that	is	walking	on	the	ground	has	tactile	contacts	that	
allow	an	awareness	of	the	ground’s	irregularities	–	bumps,	stones,	holes,	and	
so	on	–	and	tactile	contact	with	the	air	–	breezes,	vibrations,	and	so	on	–	as	
well	as	an	awareness	of	itself	as	topologically	deformed	or	agitated	by	these	
contacts.	Proprioception	 is	 thus	distinctively	 informative	of	both	body	and	
surrounds.	A	sedentary	hydrozoan	polyp	has	tentacles	bearing	cilia	that	are	
sensitive	to	vibrations	in	the	surrounding	water.	When	vibrations	occur,	the	
polyp	bends	its	tentacles	toward	their	source,	thus	toward	food	particles	such	
as	larvae.	English	marine	biologist,	D.	A.	Dorsett	states	that	the	polyp’s	bend-
ing	response	is	reflexive	because	the	movement	is	neither	generated	by	the	
polyp	itself	–	it	is	generated	by	the	vibrations	–	nor	imposed	upon	the	polyp	
–	it	is	not	the	result	of	actual	surface	to	surface	contact,	i.e.,	contact	of	animal	
body	with	solid	object.36	His	point	is	more	broadly	made	in	the	context	of	an	
analysis	 by	 M.	 S.	 Laverack,	 another	 English	 marine	 biologist,	 who	 distin-
guishes	among	four	basic	modes	of	external	proprioception	in	invertebrates.37	
The	simplest	mode	is	through	distortion	of	the	body,	whether	through	muscle	
contraction	or	passive	deformation:	external	proprioceptors	are	in	either	case	
affected.	The	second	mode	is	tethered	to	the	fact	that	animals	move	relative	
to	space;	in	effect,	contact	of	the	surface	of	an	animal’s	moving	body	with	a	
solid	object	results	in	proprioception	concerning	its	movement	and	position	
relative	to	the	object.	The	third	mode	is	also	tethered	to	the	fact	that	animals	
move	relative	to	space;	it	is	a	reiteration	of	the	second	mode	of	propriocep-
tive	stimulation	but	with	reference	to	a	substrate	rather	than	to	a	solid	object.	
The	fourth	mode	derives	from	the	circumstance	in	which	movement	of	one	
body	part	tactilely	stimulates	another	body	part	through	contact	of	external	
sensors	of	one	kind	or	another,	e.g.,	hairs,	such	contact	providing	informa-
tion	regarding	movement	and	position	of	the	two	body	parts.	To	say	that	the	
polyp’s	bending	movement	is	reflexive	is	thus	to	say	both	that	the	polyp	is	not	
stimulated	by	bodily	deformation	or	stress	(the	first	mode)38	nor	is	it	stimu-
lated	because	a	surface	of	its	body	has	come	into	contact	with	a	solid	object	
(the	second	mode).	That	the	polyp	is	sedentary	means,	of	course,	that	it	does	
not	budge	from	its	base;	hence,	the	third	mode	of	stimulation	is	not	a	possibil-
ity.	Neither	is	the	fourth	mode	since	the	movement	of	the	tentacles	does	not	
proprioceptively	stimulate	another	body	part.
34
Ibid.,	p.	351.	See	also:	M.	S.	Laverack,	“Exter-
nal	Proprioceptors”,	pp.	24–25.
35
B.	R.	Wright,	“Limb	and	Wing	Receptors	in	
Insects,	Chelicerates	and	Myriapods”,	p.	354.
36
D.	A.	Dorsett,	“The	Structure	and	Function	of	
Proprioceptors	in	Soft-Bodied	Invertebrates”,	
in:	P.	J.	Mill	(ed.),	Structure and Function of Pro-
prioceptors in the Invertebrates,	pp.	443–483,	
p.	447.
37
M.	 S.	 Laverack,	 “External	 Proprioceptors”,	
pp.	3–4.
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If	one	considers	that	tentacle	cilia	are	passive-
ly	deformed	by	vibrations	in	the	surrounding	
water,	 then	 of	 course	 a	 polyp’s	 bending	 re-
sponse	 is	 proprioceptive,	 not	 reflexive.	 See	
further	in	the	text	itself	the	discussion	Lave-
rack’s	remark	about	cilia	as	the	beginning	of	
specialized	sense	organ	structure.
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Polyps	belong	to	a	class	of	animals	called	coelenterates,	“primitive	aquatic	
animals”.39	 It	 might	 be	 tempting	 to	 generalize	 about	 proprioception	 in	 co-
elenterates	–	and	perhaps	in	other	soft-bodied	invertebrates	such	as	annelids	
and	molluscs	as	well	–	on	the	basis	of	the	above	example	and	discussion,	but	
given	the	diversity	of	coelenterate	forms	of	life,	it	would	be	a	mistake	to	write	
off	proprioception	altogether	in	such	creatures.	Different	proprioceptive	ca-
pacities	–	or	counterparts	thereof	–	are	highly	suggested	by	the	movement	of	
creatures	within	the	same	class	and	even	within	the	same	phylum.	For	exam-
ple,	a	somersaulting	hydra	is	an	exception	to	what	might	otherwise	be	consid-
ered	“the	sedentary	hydrozoan	polyp	rule”;	a	fighting	sea	anemone	similarly	
changes	its	contact	with	a	substrate,	thus,	like	a	somersaulting	hydra,	it	too	
is	open	to	proprioception	through	its	own	movement	in	space;	an	anemone	
belonging	to	the	genus	Actinostola,	though	normally	sessile,	not	only	moves	
to	distance	itself	from	chemical	substances	emitted	by	starfish	but	writhes	and	
somersaults	in	the	process.40	Clearly,	there	is	a	diversity	of	possible	proprio-
ceptive	acuities	commensurate	with	the	diversity	of	life	itself.
Now	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 proprioception	 is	 less	 evident	 in	 soft-bodied	
invertebrates	and	is	difficult	to	document,41	marine	biologists	readily	affirm	
a	range	of	proprioceptive	possibilities	in	these	creatures.	Laverack,	for	exam-
ple,	states	that
“Proprioceptive	units	in	the	flexible	body	wall	of	soft-bodied	animals	are	probably	legion,	[al-
though]	…	few	have	been	shown	either	anatomically	or	physiologically”;42
Dorsett	states	with	respect	to	soft-bodied	invertebrates	generally	that	“abun-
dant	opportunities	for	true	proprioception	occur”.43	Dorsett’s	and	Laverack’s	
affirmation	in	the	face	of	comparatively	slim	evidence	warrants	a	moment’s	
reflection	as	does	the	related	conceptually	challenging	notion	of	“true	prop-
rioception”.
The	best	evidence	for	proprioception	in	soft-bodied	invertebrates	comes	from	
studies	of	gastropods	(molluscs)	whose	complex	feeding	behavior	is	modu-
lated	by	proprioception	according	 to	 load.	Given	 the	difference	 in	animate	
form	between	a	gastropod	and	a	sedentary	polyp	–	which	difference	of	course	
means	a	difference	in	movement	possibilities	and	thus	in	behavioral	possibili-
ties44	–	 it	 is	not	surprising	 to	find	proprioceptive	capacities	 readily	evident	
in	the	one	and	not	in	the	other.	It	is	precisely	in	this	context	of	recognizing	
differences	 in	animate	form	that	 the	significance	of	both	the	affirmation	of	
proprioception	 and	 the	 notion	 of	 “true	 proprioception”	 becomes	 apparent:	
What	would	dispose	marine	biologists	to	affirm	“proprioceptive	units”	in	the	
face	of	slim	evidence	 if	not	an	 intuitive	sense	of	 the	central	 importance	of	
proprioception	to	animate	life	in	general,	and	in	particular,	of	its	necessity	in	
carrying	through	observed	complex	feeding	behaviors	such	as	those	of	certain	
gastropod	species?	What	if	not	this	intuitive	sense	generates	the	idea	of	“true	
proprioception”,	thus	the	idea	that	there	are	lesser	forms	of	the	same,	forms	
one	might	historically	call	proto-proprioception?	Consider	the	following	re-
mark	that	validates	just	such	evolutionary	notions:
“[I]n	passing	from	the	coelenterates	to	the	annelids	and	molluscs,	we	are	looking	at	some	of	the	
earliest	stages	in	the	evolution	and	organization	of	the	nervous	system	and	must	ask	ourselves	at	
what	stage	does	a	true	proprioceptive	sense	arise.”45
The	question	is	indeed	provocative:	at	what	stage	does	“a	true	proprioceptive	
sense	arise”?	Does	it	arise	with	molluscs,	for	example?	Or	can	it	be	said	to	
have	arisen	with	some	of	the	presumably	earlier	evolving	coelenterates?	On	
the	other	hand,	what	is	“true	proprioception”?	And	can	a	“stage”	be	pinpoint-
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ed	as	its	inception?;	that	is,	is	it	possible	to	say	with	respect	to	any	particu-
lar	group	of	creatures	and	with	respect	to	any	particular	evolutionary	period,	
“true	proprioception	starts	here”?	In	view	of	the	diversity	of	creaturely	life,	
one	might	rather	say	 that	“true	proprioception”	arises	for	each	creature	ac-
cording	to	the	animate	form	it	is,	and	that	if	“true	proprioception”	does	not	
arise,	 the	 form	does	not	 arise	 either	because	 it	 is	not	kinetically	viable.	 In	
other	words,	one	might	want	to	say	that	the	origin	of	proprioception	is	not	an	
historical	event	as	such;	it	is	an	event	tied	to	the	evolution	of	animate forms.	
Indeed,	the	evolution	of	formal	diversity	speaks	to	the	evolution	of	a	diversity	
of	proprioceptive	capacities	because	it	speaks	of	the	same	phenomenon:	the	
evolution	of	forms	of	life	as	forms	of	animation.
From	 the	above	corporeal	matters	of	 fact,	we	can	 in	 fact	begin	 to	distill	 a	
sense	of	 the	evolution	of	proprioception,	from	a	meta-corporeal	conscious-
ness	to	a	corporeal	consciousness	through	the	evolution	of	external	sensors.	
As	all	of	the	above	examples	suggest,	the	undoubtedly	multiple	beginnings	
of	proprioception	are	in	each	instance	tied	to	surface recognition sensitivity,	
an	original	tactile	faculty	subserving	movement	and	the	recognition	of	some-
thing	 outside	 of	 one’s	 own	 body.	 Laverack’s	 remark	 about	 cilia-organelles	
that	are	present	in	groups	of	creatures	from	protozoa	(unicellular	eukaryotic	
organisms	such	as	paramecia	and	amoebas)	to	mammals	–	is	highly	sugges-
tive	in	this	respect.	He	writes	that
“If	the	cilium	may	be	taken	as	at	least	a	simple	starting	point	for	sense	organ	structure	we	may	
look	for	receptors	even	amongst	the	protozoa.	Sensitivity	towards	physico-chemical	events	is	
well	known,	but	specialized	receptors	much	less	so.”46
His	remark	may	be	glossed	in	the	following	way:	the	evolution	of	sense	or-
gans	at	the	most	primitive	eukaryotic	level	heralds	a	new	kind	of	sensitivity,	
one	mediated	by	specialized	sense	organs,	i.e.,	cilia,	rather	than	by	physico-
chemical	events,	but	still	serving	the	same	basic	function:	movement	and	the	
recognition	of	something	outside	one’s	own	body.	While	this	surface	sensiti-
vity	is	spoken	of	in	terms	of	“mechanoreception”,47	it	is	clearly,	and	indeed,	
39
W.	T.	Keeton	and	J.	L.	Gould,	Biological Sci-
ence,	p.	161.
40
Bayard	 H.	 McConnaughey,	 Introduction to 
Marine Biology,	C.	V.	Mosby,	St.	Louis	1978,	
pp.	270–272.
41
D.	A.	Dorsett,	“The	Structure	and	Function	of	
Proprioceptors	in	Soft-Bodied	Invertebrates”,	
p.	479.
42
M.	 S.	 Laverack,	 “External	 Proprioceptors”,	
p.	11.
43
D.	A.	Dorsett,	“The	Structure	and	Function	of	
Proprioceptors	in	Soft-Bodied	Invertebrates”,	
p.	479.
44
For	an	excellent	discussion	of	morphology	in	
relation	to	movement	and	of	the	evolution	of	
arthropods	from	annelids	with	respect	to	that	
relationship,	 see:	 S.	 M.	 Manton,	 “Locomo-
tory	 Habits	 and	 the	 Evolution	 of	 the	 Larger	
Arthropodan	Groups”,	in:	Evolution (Sympo-
sia of the Society for Experimental Biology, 
No. VII),	Academic	 Press,	 New	 York	 1953,	
pp.	339–376.	The	eminent	biologist	 J.	B.	S.	
Haldane	 spoke	 laudingly	of	Manton’s	work,	
saying	“Manton	has	done	for	a	phylum	what	
comparative	ethologists	have	done	for	small	
vertebrate	groups	such	as	 the	Anatidae”	and	
described	her	as	a	“pioneer”	(J.	B.	S.	Haldane,	
“Foreword”,	Evolution,	pp.	xvi,	xvii).
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from	 the	 viewpoint	 of	 living	 organisms,	 more	 appropriately	 specified	 as	 a	
form	of	tactile-reception.	The	protozoan	ciliate	species	Stentor,	for	example,	
uses	 its	 cilia	 to	 sweep	 away	 noxious	 particles	 and	 the	 Stentor	 itself	 bends	
away	from	the	tactile	disturbance.48	With	the	recognition	of	cilia	as	beginning	
specialized	sense	organs,	 the	notion	of	“true	proprioception”	is	definitively	
recast.	 It	 is	not	a	historical	attainment	but	a	consistent	 function	of	animate	
form.
Specified	in	animate	terms,	animate	forms	disclose	even	broader	evolution-
ary	continuities.	A	bacterium	that	goes	about	sampling	the	environment	is	not	
sensitive	to	shape	or	to	movement	but	to	the	chemical	composition	of	its	en-
vironment.	Its	sensitivity	is	all	the	same	similarly	mediated	by	touch,	it	simi-
larly	subserves	movement,	and	it	is	similarly	meta-corporeal.	Hence,	in	both	
prokaryotic	(single	cell,	no	nucleus	and	no	membrane-enclosed	organelles)	
and	early	unicellular	and	multicellular	eukaryotic	forms	of	life,	tactility	is	a	
way	of	knowing	the	world	and	making	one’s	way	within	it,	the	source	of	both	
organismic	movement	and	cognition.	An	evolutionary	pattern	thus	begins	to	
emerge	with	respect	to	surface recognition sensitivity.	The	pattern	is	evident	
in	prokaryotic	organisms,	which	are	tactilely	sensitive	to	their	physico-chemi-
cal	environment	and	which	move	dynamically	commensurate	with	that	sensi-
tivity,	i.e.,	sampling,	foundering,	changing	direction;	eukaryotic	forms	of	life	
emerge,	which	are	tactilely	sensitive	to	the	environment	through	specialized	
sense	organs	and	which	move	in	ways	coincident	with	that	sensitivity,	proto-
zoan	ciliates	responding	to	noxious	elements	in	the	environment	by	bending	
or	sweeping	movements,	for	example,	the	cilia	of	sedentary	polyps	respond-
ing	to	vibrations	in	the	surrounding	medium	and	exciting	the	polyp	to	bend	
a	tentacle	toward	food,	mobile	forms	such	as	annelids	and	molluscs	moving	
in	strikingly	more	 intricate	and	varied	ways	on	 the	basis	of	more	complex	
external	organs	sensitive	to	deformation	and	stress.	In	sum,	the	pattern	is	a	dy-
namic	one.	Whatever	the	form	of	surface	sensitivity	in	prokaryotic	and	early	
eukaryotic	forms	of	life,	it	is	ultimately	in	the	service	of	movement:	toward	or	
away	from	chemicals	in	the	environment,	toward	sources	of	food,	away	from	
noxious	elements	or	alien	creatures,	and	so	on.
A	 surface	 sensitivity	 subserving	 movement	 becomes	 apparent	 the	 moment	
one	looks	to	corporeal	matters	of	fact,	analyzes	them	in	sensory-kinetic	terms,	
realizes	 the	centrality	and	significance	of	movement	 to	creaturely	 life,	 and	
begins	thinking	in	terms	of	a	natural	history	of	animate form.	It	clearly	sug-
gests	the	basis	on	which	proprioception	arises	and	is	clearly	suggestive	too	of	
its	crucial	significance.	A	commonly	cited	definition	of	proprioceptors	justly	
acknowledges	a	prime	aspect	of	this	significance,	namely,	continuous	sensiti-
vity.49	Not	only	is	a	creature’s	surface	in	contact	continuously	with	a	medium	
or	with	other	surfaces	in	the	environment	–	whether	it	is	moving	or	whether	
it	 is	still	–	but	 its	own	conformations	continuously	change	in	the	course	of	
moving.	Continuous	 sensitivity	 is	 thus	doubly	 indicative	of	how	a	moving	
creature	profits	from	such	organs:	it	is	sensitive	both	to	the	changing	world	
in	which	it	finds	itself	and	to	its	own	movement	and	changing	bodily	form.	
Moving	creatures	–	animate	forms	–	are,	in	fact,	topological	entities,	chang-
ing	 shape	 as	 they	move	and	moving	 as	 they	 change	 shape.	Proprioception	
implicitly	articulates	this	truth.	Deeper	and	more	detailed	study	shows	it	to	
articulate	a	further	truth;	namely,	that	animal	movement,	however	centrally	
programmed,	cannot	be	considered	to	be	wholly	devoid	of	proprioception.50	
However	rote	its	basic	behaviors	might	be	with	respect	to	its	day	to	day	living	
in	the	world,	a	creature	is	necessarily	sensitive	in	a	proprioceptive	sense	to	
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the	present	moment;	it	begins	crawling,	undulating,	flying,	stepping,	elongat-
ing,	contracting,	or	whatever,	in	the	context	of	a	present	circumstance.	It	is,	
in	a	word,	kinetically spontaneous.	When	it	does	move,	it	breaks	forth	from	
whatever	resting	position	it	was	in;	it	initiates	movement	and	in	ways	appro-
priate	to	the	situation	at	hand.	The	inherent	spontaneity	of	animate	forms	lies	
fundamentally	in	this	fact.
Kinetic	spontaneity	may	be	analyzed	in	terms	of	kinesthetic	motivations,	in	
terms	of	a	species-specific	range	of	movement	possibilities,	in	terms	of	an	in-
dividual	repertoire	of	what	might	be	termed	“I	can’s”,	and	in	terms	of	a	sense	
of	agency.	As	might	be	apparent,	these	dimensions	of	spontaneity	are	keenly	
inter-related.	A	creature’s	initiation	of	movement	is	coincident	with	its	kine-
sthetic	motivations	–	its	disposition	to	do	this	or	that;	its	kinesthetic	motiva-
tions	fall	within	the	range	of	its	species-specific	movement	possibilities;	these	
possibilities	are	the	basis	of	its	repertoire	of	“I	can’s”;	as	enacted,	any	item	
within	its	repertoire	of	“I	can’s”	is	undergirded	proprioceptively	by	a	sense	of	
agency.	A	creature’s	corporeal	consciousness	is	a	composite	of	these	four	ki-
netic	dimensions	of	spontaneity.	In	effect,	creatures	know	themselves	–	“they	
know	which	thing	in	the	world	they	are”	–	in	ways	that	are	fundamentally	and	
quintessentially	consistent	with	the	bodies	they	are.	They	know	themselves	
in	these	terms	not	by	looking,	i.e.,	not	by	way	of	what	is	visible	to	them	of	
their	visual	bodies,	but	proprioceptively,	or	more	finely,	kinesthetically,	i.e.,	
in	ways	specific	to	movement	alone,	sensing	their	bodies	as	animate	forms	in	
movement	and	at	rest.
As	indicated,	this	form	of	creaturely	knowing	can	be	definitively	spelled	out	
along	evolutionary	lines,	indeed,	specifically	along	the	lines	of	descent	with	
modification.	The	evolutionary	pattern	sketched	above	emphasized	the	ba-
48
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ject	of	this	exercise	is	not	to	establish	whether	
particular	 sorts	of	 animal	can	possibly	 learn	
from	 proprioceptive	 inputs	 in	 any	 circum-
stances	(since	that	question	is	unanswerable),	
but	 rather	 whether	 they	 normally	 appear	 to	
do	so.”	–	“Proprioception	and	Learning”,	in:	
Structure and Function of Proprioceptors in 
the Invertebrates,	pp.	567–604,	pp.	567–68.
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sic	phenomenon	of	surface	recognition	sensitivity	–	beginning	with	bacteria	
and	proceeding	to	ciliated	protozoa,	to	sedentary	invertebrates,	and	to	mol-
luscs	and	annelids.	This	beginning	sketch	can	be	amplified.	Creatures	such	as	
lobsters	and	spiders	–	arthropods	–	are	creatures	with	an	articulable	skeleton,	
hence	they	have	not	only	external	sensors	but	internal	ones	as	well,	particu-
larly	around	their	jointed	appendages.	Generally	termed	chordotonal	organs	
in	invertebrates,	these	internal	proprioceptors	are	sensitive	directly	to	stresses	
within	the	body	itself.	On	the	basis	of	organic	analogues	and	structural	ho-
mologies,	 biologists	 believe	 these	 internal	 proprioceptors	 to	 have	 derived	
from	external	sensory	organs,	that	is,	to	be	the	result	of	a	migration	of	certain	
formerly	external	proprioceptive	bodily	structures.	Thus,	Laverack	states	that	
“Evolutionary	trends	in	several	groups	[of	invertebrates]	show	a	gradual	re-
moval	of	proprioceptors	from	the	surface	to	a	deep	or	 internal	placement”,	
and	points	out	that	this	derivation,	while	apparent	in	some	invertebrates,	“is	
demonstrable	in	vertebrates”,	giving	as	example	“the	change	in	position	of	the	
acoustico-lateralis	system	in	fish	and	amphibia”.51	He	points	out	that	internal	
proprioceptive	organs	are	not	directly	vulnerable	to	environmental	wear	and	
tear	and	in	this	sense	are	protected.	Creatures	with	internal	proprioceptors	are	
thus	not	at	the	direct	mercy	of	the	surrounding	world.	Arthropods	and	verte-
brates	are	both	notable	in	this	respect.	Though	their	evolutionary	lineages	are	
distinct,	species	within	each	phylum	are	similar	in	having	a	skeletal	structure	
and	in	being	extremely	mobile	forms.	Although	their	respective	skeletal	struc-
ture	is	differently	placed	–	invertebrate	skeletons	are	outside,	vertebrate	skele-
tons	are	inside	–	the	attaching	muscular	structure	is	in	each	case	internal	and	
functions	in	a	similar	manner;	when	a	muscle	contracts,	skeletal	joints	close,	
pulling	two	body	segments	toward	each	other.	A	direct	and	continuous	sen-
sitivity	to	movement	thus	appears	to	have	evolved	in	two	distinct	but	highly	
mobile	 forms	 of	 life	 and	 with	 the	 same	 advantage:	 an	 internally-mediated	
corporeal	consciousness	of	movement	that	is	not	dependent	on	external	stimu-
li,	hence	on	tactility,	but	 that	 is	 internally	mediated.	This	kind	of	corporeal	
consciousness	is	not	only	relatively	protected	as	well	as	continuous	in	com-
parison	 to	 an	 externally-mediated	 corporeal	 consciousness.	 Being	 internal,	
its	possibilities	for	elaboration	are	quite	different.	In	particular,	what	is	being	
sensed	in	the	case	of	an	internally-mediated	corporeal	consciousness	has	the	
possibility	of	opening	up,	of	expanding	 into	a	 richly	variable	and	complex	
domain	of	awarenesses.	The	possibility	of	such	a	domain	is	adumbrated	in	
the	question	“What	is	it	like	to	be	a	bat?”.	Indeed,	the	question	presumes	the	
existence	of	an	internally-mediated	corporeal	consciousness	that	has	already	
opened	up	into	a	range	of	kinetically	tied	and	internally	felt	phenomena	and	
acts.	In	other	words,	it	presupposes	a	range	of	experiences	that	a	bat	has	both	
of	itself	as	an	animate	form	and	of	a	particular	world	in	which	it	moves.	Pro-
prioception	is	in	this	sense	an	epistemological gateway,	one	that,	by	descent	
with	modification,	may	clearly	be	elaborated	both	affectively	and	cognitively.	
In	just	such	ways,	corporeal	consciousness	shows	itself	to	have	the	possibi-
lity	of	expanding	ultimately	into	a	sense	of	self.	Proprioceptive	descent	with	
modification	foundationally	explains	this	possible	expansion.	“The	Reality	of	
Selves”	has	its	roots	in	corporeal	consciousness.
In	sum,	if	the	evolutionary	thesis	is	correct	that	external	proprioceptors	were	
modified	and	internalized	over	time,	then	a	singularly	significant	consequence	
obtains:	internally-mediated	proprioception,	however	variously	accomplished	
in	terms	of	anatomical	structures,	remains	nonetheless	consistent	in	its	results,	
viz,	a	directly	movement-sensitive	corporeal	consciousness.52	In	effect,	under-
standings	of	the	evolution	of	proprioception	lead	precisely	to	understandings	
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of	the	provenience	of	consciousness.	Through	all	the	intricate	and	changing	
pathways	of	descent	with	modification,	know thyself	has	remained	a	consist-
ent	biological	built-in;	a	kinetic	corporeal	consciousness	informs	a	diversity	
of	animate	forms.
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone
Bewusstsein: Eine Naturgeschichte
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Artikel wird gezeigt, dass die angemessene Fragestellung bezüglich des Bewusstseins 
nicht darauf abzielt, wie sich Bewusstsein in der Materie niederschlägt, sondern auf die Art und 
Weise, in der das Bewusstsein als fester Bestandteil zur Evolution der Lebensformen gehört. Die 
Verfasserin zeichnet eine solche Evolution nach, indem sie reale Lebensformen einschließlich 
Bakterien und Wirbellose berücksichtigt, und vertritt die evolutionäre These, dass externe pro-
priozeptive Organe – wie anhand ihrer selbst nachgewiesen wurde – sich im Laufe der Zeit 
modifiziert und zu inneren kinästhetischen Organen gewandelt und so das motorisch-senso-
rische Körperbewusstsein während des Bestehens aller möglichen evolutionären Lebensformen 
aufrechterhalten haben. Ferner spezifiziert die Autorin bedeutende Konsequenzen ihrer These, 
die sich zum einen auf das Unbewusste beziehen, des Weiteren auf aktuelle Brennpunktstudien 
über das Gehirn, bei der die korrelative Naturgeschichte in Abrede gestellt wird, sowie auf das 
Bedürfnis, sich mit körperbezogenen Tatsachen zu befassen.
Schlüsselbegriffe
Lebensformen,	 Leben	 (Animation),	 Responsivität	 (Ansprechvermögen),	 propriozeptive	 Organe,	
Kinästhesie,	 körperliches	 Bewusstsein,	 oberflächliche	 Rekognitionssensitivität,	 kinetische	 Sponta-
nität,	„Erkenne	dich	selbst”	als	biologisch	eingebauter	Prozess
Maxine Sheets-Johnstone
La conscience : une histoire naturelle
Résumé
L’article montre que la question appropriée en matière de conscience n’est pas « comment 
la conscience s’articule dans la matière » mais de quelle manière la conscience est-elle un 
élément de l’évolution des formes animées. L’article décrit justement cette évolution en exa-
minant des formes de vie réelles, y compris des bactéries et des invertébrés. Il donne raison à 
la thèse évolutionnaire selon laquelle les organes proprioceptifs externes, en tant que tels, se 
sont transformés et intériorisés au fil du temps en organes kinesthésiques tout en maintenant 
de fait une conscience corporelle du mouvement sensible à travers quasiment toutes les formes 
de l’évolution de la vie. Le texte précise les conséquences significatives de la thèse concernant 
l’inconscient, sur des études actuelles centrées sur le cerveau qui négligent l’histoire naturelle 
corrélative, ainsi que sur le besoin de suivre les aspects corporels.
Mots-clés
formes	animées,	animation,	responsivité,	organes	proprioceptifs,	kinesthésie,	conscience	corporelle,	
reconnaissance	superficielle	de	la	sensibilité,	spontanéité	cinétique,	«	connaissance	de	soi	»	comme	
partie	intégrante	biologique
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M.	S.	Laverack,	“External	Proprioceptors”.
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Cf.	ibid.,	p.	48:	“If	the	thesis	that	many	inter-
nal	receptors	may	derive	from	external	recep-
tors,	(sic)	is	valid,	then	it	would	be	anticipated	
that	 the	 properties	 of	 all	 mechanoreceptors	
will	be	similar.	Variety	may	be	expected	as	a	
result	largely	of	anatomical	rather	than	physio-
logical	attributes.”
